Do insiders crowd out analysts?

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dc.contributor.authorGilbert, A
dc.contributor.authorTourani-Rad, A
dc.contributor.authorWisniewski, T
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-21T02:49:18Z
dc.date.available2011-02-21T02:49:18Z
dc.date.copyright2004
dc.date.created2004
dc.date.issued2004
dc.description.abstractBoth insiders and analysts are involved in the collection and dissemination of information to the market, roles which impact heavily on price efficiency and resource allocation. The differences between the two groups, however, result in a competitive relationship with analysts at a disadvantage as they face greater costs associated with information gathering. As a result they may choose not to participate in a onesided competition. We employ transaction data to examine the impact of firm-year aggregate insider trading intensity on the level of analyst following. We find a negative relationship between insider trading intensity and analyst coverage. This result was driven by large blockholders suggesting that analysts are attracted to higher levels of information asymmetry from which they profit.
dc.identifier.other13-2004
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10292/1147
dc.publisherAUT Faculty of Business
dc.relation.urihttp://www.aut.ac.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/48470/enterprise_and_innovation_13-2004.pdf
dc.rights2004 © - Copyright of the Author(s)
dc.rights.accessrightsOpenAccess
dc.sourceEnterprise and Innovation, 2004, 13
dc.subjectAnalyst Following
dc.subjectInsider Trading
dc.subjectDisclosure
dc.subjectInformational Asymmetry
dc.titleDo insiders crowd out analysts?
dc.typeWorking Paper
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